Tanya Reeves & Dr. Lesley Wright
Brunel University
UK
The commercialism of the modern sporting game has been widely
understood through the identification of categories in terms of
internal/external goods and sport as a practice/institution. While these
concepts have yielded much fruitful discussion, this paper proposes to show how
this bifurcation of the sporting experience into practice/institution and
internal/external good tends to polarise valuation into simplistic categories
such as pure/impure. The purpose of this paper is to propose that the
application of a tri-partite axiology provides a more sophisticated and
illuminating way to an understanding of the commercial values in the modern
sporting game.
1. Introduction
1.1 Many writers have explored the distinction between
internal/external goods and practice/institution (Gibson, 1993; Morgan, 1994;
Arnold, 1997). Their starting point came from MacIntyre (1985). In his book ‘After
Virtue’, MacIntyre defines a ‘practice’ as "a joint project in which
goods internal to that project are realised in trying to achieve the standards
of excellence which characterise it" (p.32). The concept of a ‘practice’
gains its meaning partly though comparison with the concept of an ‘institution’.
The institution is essentially concerned with the acquisition of external goods
and the distribution of money, power, and social status, all of which are
contingently related to the institution. An institution legitimises and
underwrites practices and thereby has opportunity to corrupt them, though, this
too, is contingently related to the institution. It is concerned with
large-scale bureaucratic organisation, regulation and administration of the
commodity.
1.2 The practice is ultimately dependent on the institution for
its survival. The relationship of practice to institution is an extremely
intimate one where one impacts on the other. McIntyre considers that,
inevitably, the ideals and creativity of the practice and the co-operative care
for common goods of the practice and are always vulnerable to the
acquisitiveness and the competitiveness of the institution. The potential danger
is that the standards of excellence inherent in the practice become trivialised
in this process and the practice is undermined by the institution to such an
extent that it becomes barely recognisable. Sport as an end in itself is
subordinated to its purpose as a means to an end. Internal and external goods
are further defined in terms of exclusivity. External goods such as money and
status are characteristically someone’s property and their possession by one
person necessarily denies another person’s possession. Internal goods,
however, are not subject to such restraints and are available equally to all.
1.3 It is often argued (MacIntyre, 1985; Morgan, 1994; Gibson,1993; Arnold,
1997) that when examining the effects of commercialism in sport, that the ‘practice’
has a certain purity which needs protection and which can only be provided by
the ‘institution’, however, in reality the institutions neglect their
support of the practice in favour of the external goods available. This is
because institutions operate according to a dynamic whereby professional
athletes receive financial reward and consequently the sports and their
participants are progressively taken over by ‘business imperatives’
(Armstrong, 1996; Slack, 1998; Kidd, 1988). Guterson (1994) takes it to a
personal level when he writes:
1.4 Lasch (1979) has argued that the institution has corrupted
the sporting game, to the point of its degradation and even obliteration.
However, it will be argued that this bifurcation of the sporting experience into
practice/institution and internal/external good tends to polarise valuation into
simplistic categories such as pure/impure. The polarisation of these concepts of
‘practice’ and ‘institution’ has misled us and cannot sustain the kinds
of critique outlined above. The purpose of this paper is to propose a tripartite
axiology, which is more fruitful and sophisticated than the practice/institution
bifurcation. In the rest of this paper we shall therefore (1) challenge the
clear cut distinction between ‘practice' and 'institution’, (2) explain the
meaning and value of a tripartite axiological analysis over a binary analysis,
and (3) show through specific examples the value of applying a tripartite
axiology to our understanding of commercialism in sport.
2. The clear-cut distinction between ‘practice' and
'institution’ - challenged
2.1 MacNamee (1995) has shown that the basis on which the
distinction has been made is questionable. He questions both the conclusion
and the premises. First, he asks of external goods at what point can "we
at least meaningfully ask when sports were ever present without their
existence" (p 63). Sport has, by implication, always been
institutionalised. Second, he highlights many examples where the institution
has acted as the moral gatekeeper to this particular practice. Sport continues
to encourage co-operation among team-mates, to enforces rules of fair play,
and to give expression to, even as it disciplines, the competitive urge -
features that are seldom observed, let alone revered or cultivated, in larger
society. Lasch (1979) and Morgan (1994) have argued the same point, that is,
that the practice of sport is more robust than has been implied. In this
respect, the latter says:
it has, for instance, staved off the erosion of standards of
excellence that has plagued most of its cultural kinsfolk, and,
notwithstanding the corrosive impact of television, the sporting public
remains more knowledgeable and discriminating about sport than the art
public is about art (p.34).
2.2 McNamee also questions the primacy of the needs of the practice over the
power of the institution at an ontological level. He questions the premise
that internal goods are defined as being in some way inherent and thereby
almost definitional of the activity while external goods are contingently
related, i.e. they could equally well be derived from other activities. With
regard to the latter, while it is certainly true that money could be derived
from any number of activities, and is not necessarily related to sport, the
question needs to be posed what other activities could attract such patterns
of money in the way that sport does. In the case of Michael Jordan, it is a
matter for speculation how much the spin-offs of his sporting fame have
brought him. But the facts, as reported by Andrews (1996), speak for
themselves:
a ground-breaking endorsement contract with Nike; eleven
versions of the Air Jordan shoes; numerous Nike advertising campaigns; six
seasons as the NBA’s leading scorer; three NBA championships with the
Chicago Bulls; one Dream Team; a vast portfolio of corporate endorsements; a
highly publicised retirement and flirtation with baseball; and an equally
high profile return to the NBA leading to a 7th NBA scoring title
and a 4th NBA championship (p.14).
It could be argued that monetary status is often regarded as a
definitive badge of approbation for sporting success. Similarly, although fame
in the abstract sense may not necessarily be connected to being a
sportsperson, MacNamee argues the kind of fame characteristic of what it is to
be a sportsperson is tied to the internal logic of practices such as sport
since they are "public celebrations of ludic capacities" (p.62).
2.3 One of the main distinctions between sport as a practice
and sport as an institution is made by the criterion of exclusivity: a
sportsperson’s possession of an external good excludes another sportsperson’s
possession of it. Internal goods, such as skill, enjoyment, on the other hand,
are available to all. McNamee questions whether this assumption of exclusivity
is warranted. In the case of external goods, a major advancement in a sporting
field may bring fame and fortune to the perpetrator primarily. But, in many
cases all participants in that sport benefit from the reflected glory. He
gives the example of Martina Navratilova. Not only did she attract massive
publicity to herself by winning Wimbledon seven times, but also she
effectively showed that women’s tennis could and should be treated
seriously. Conversely, internal goods, which are supposedly available to all,
depend in some measure on the individual. Enjoyment may theoretically be
available to all in equal measure, but skill is at least partly due,
genetically speaking, to they luck of the draw, and the consequent enjoyment
contingent on this skill is therefore not available to all.
2.4 McNamee questions the primacy of agency to the acquisition
of internal, but not external goods. He uses McIntyre’s example of a child
who is motivated to play a game of chess only in so far as he is rewarded with
candy. However, over time, the child comes to recognise the skill, analyticity
and other internal goods involved which gradually become his/her prime
motivation. The point at which the change is made from a valuation of external
to internal goods depends on the agent's intentions, which are only
conclusively known to the agent himself/herself. The same applies on a much
larger scale, whereby overtly an institution may claim to police a sport to
protect its internal goods whereas the external goods are actually the main
motivation. MacNamee reminds us that the acquisition of both internal and
external goods depends on agency. Agency implies motivation, which may never
be fully publicly known. External goods are not necessarily randomly
conferred, just as internal goods are not "solely the product of the
successful exercise of some of our dispositions within a sporting form of
life" (p.70). McNamee has successfully shown that the distinction between
sport as a practice and sport as an institution is not as clear-cut as has
frequently been proposed. It is at the very least incomplete. Although it has
led to a great deal of fruitful discussion it can be a misleading framework
because it implies a one-way dissection of values between practice and
institution, internal and external goods with the inevitable corollary that
one implies purity while the other is less than pure.
In the rest of this paper it is proposed that in order to
understand the effects of commercial values on sport, a more sophisticated
axiology, namely a tri-partite analysis, is required to explain the
inter-related nature of this relationship.
3 The meaning and value of a tri-partite axiological analysis
3.1 Hartman (1967) claimed that there are three ways of
looking at a concept: as a synthetic entity, this refers to its defining
characteristics; as a comparative or analytic entity where value is gained in
comparison to other entities; or, as a singular entity, where the value the
entity has is as an individual, because of its uniqueness, irrespective of
comparisons with other similar entities. These will be examined in turn and
applied to sporting situations.
3.2 First, as a synthetic or technical construction, a
football club is its defining characteristics for example, the players,
grounds, officials, administrators, media representations and supporters. It
is defined ostensively. A synthetic abstraction lacks richness of meaning. It
is frequently represented by numbers. In the case of the commercialisation of
sport, an athlete’s performance is often summarised numerically, for
example, the player's transfer value. A football player looked at
synthetically is a commodity to be bought and sold between clubs. It is not
that buying and selling is intrinsically wrong, but neither does giving an
entity a numerical worth validate it. As Sewart (1987) says, "It is not
that statistical analysis is a priori incorrect. Rather, the statistical
analysis of subjective experience mandates a more exhaustive examination"
(p.184). Numbers tend to create unwarranted awe in the public. This sentiment
is echoed by Ramsden (1992). He says: "There is nothing intrinsically
valid about something that has numbers attached to it. An apple with a price
tag on it is not necessarily a better apple, nor does it provide a less
subjective eating experience" (p.230). Neither is comparative or analytic
value a truly meaningful way to validate entities in sport. An analytic
construction is normative, in that it derives its value as a comparative
reference. Like synthetic constructions, comparisons (e.g. league tables,
competitions) are useful in the context of the marketplace.
3.3 Second, an analytic or comparative construction derives
its meaning from comparison with other entities, for example a football team
exists in leagues, championships and in the marketplace (merchandising and
player transfer). Synthetic and comparative values can be applied together.
For example, a football player can be valued synthetically, and bought from
one club for £5000,000. The club, which has now acquired a player, is viewed
analytically, i.e., in comparison with other clubs in relation to the
transfer- value of their players. This transaction is valued both
synthetically and analytically.
3.4 The third type of valuation in Hartman’s (1967) axiology is individual
or singular appraisal. It is totally different. A singular entity has value as
an individual irrespective of comparisons with other similar entities. Moral
and aesthetic worth are inextricably linked with the individual as a singular
entity. As a singular entity it has value as an individual irrespective of
comparisons with other similar entities, it is the value of the thing or being
in itself. In terms of human beings, it results from the fulfilment of the
person’s concept of herself or himself. People who fulfil their
self-concepts have an understanding and an integration of what they do, their
conformity, or, lack of conformity to systems, and their function as members
of various groups. A footballer, for example, has infinitely more value, since
(s)he is valued as a person who is unique. (S)he is seen as a team-mate,
friend, long-term player, and part of the side’s strike capacity, midfield
or defence. His/her value as an individual is on a higher level of richness
than his/her worth in comparison with other footballers. But not all prized
players are great. Some players are aggregated in teams, which inspire loyalty
due to their individuality, irrespective of the quality of play. These core
‘fans’ show that the team as a single entity transcends systemic or
comparative worth.
3.5 It is not just individual people who can be valued as
singular entities. The most valuable way to regard football some would argue
is individually, as an end in itself. Hornby considers; "the things that
I have often tried to explain to people about football - that it is not an
escape, or a form of entertainment, but a different version of the world…"(Hornby,
1996, p.164). The corruption in modern day sport has been portrayed as typical
of the general degradation in all practices over-dominated by their
concomitant institution (Arnold, 1997; Lasch, 1979; Morgan, 1991; Sewart,
1987). This view is by no means universally held. Singular valuation of an
individual’s talent does occur more often in modern day football than other
comparable activities. Hornby (1996), for example, elucidates, "the
scouting system in football is foolproof, everyone gets watched. Unlike in the
arts when you can get along because of who you know, you cannot get on in
sport without the talent" (p.219).
4 Applying the analysis to commercialism in sport
4.1 It could be argued, for example, that singular or
individual valuation is open to corruption when it becomes transfigured though
instrumentality into analytic valuation. For example, Lasch (1979) talks about
a competitive individualism, which blurs the boundaries between the singular
and the analytic. The culture of Narcissus, Lasch (1979) believes,
characterises modern living, and has turned individual concern for happiness
to narcissistic preoccupation with the self (in comparison with other people).
The narcissist of the present age is deemed by Lasch (1979) a ‘minimal self’
looking to others for feelings of self-worth by comparison to raise their
self-esteem.
4.2 Similarly, MacIntyre (1985) claimed that emotivism
"...has become embodied in our culture" (p.22). Emotivism is a moral
theory, whereby moral utterances are characterised by a lack of intrinsic
worth. They have meaning only as a result of their instrumental value (like
analytic or technical constructions) to express the interlocutor’s
preferences. In terms of moral worth, to say ‘Doping is wrong because it is
cheating’ has equivalent moral worth for an emotivist to a football crowd
shouting ‘Come on, you reds!’
4.3 Emotivism is effective to explain the use of moral terms
and declarations, as opposed to their meaning. However, as MacIntyre (1985)
argues, the lack of any rational criteria to judge the moral worth of the
declaration results in the distinctively modern standpoint which envisages
moral debate in terms of a confrontation between incompatible and
incommensurable moral premises, and moral commitment as the expression of a
criterionless choice for which no rational commitment can be given. The modern
concern with celebrity as opposed to fame shows a similar respect for
criterionless choice. Individuals can become celebrities for many reasons,
often for deeds which might best be forgotten, witness the infamous ‘Cantona
kick’ which has rendered Eric Cantona more well known for an act of
unwarranted aggression than any skill on the field.
4.4 The purpose of this paper has not been to diminish the
importance of MacIntyre’s (1985) thesis, but rather to build on McNamee’s
(1995) critique in a constructive way. The two main arguments for the
tripartite axiology as opposed to MacIntyre’s (1985) bifurcation is that it
recognises the phenomenological character of value: when sport is valued
singularly (as opposed to comparatively or technically), it is valued for its
sake. It does not have to justify itself through the (problematic)
identification of internal goods and the ostensive definition of the practice.
Sport, be it the practice or the institution, is open to corruption when it is
valued synthetically and comparatively. But to simplistically wed depravity to
the institution neglects the potential for the institution to develop the
sport in question; similarly, the motives of the practitioners to be less than
pure (alleged match fixing is a good example here). It depends on the
inclinations of the agents involved, which belong to a wider framework than
that furnished by the practice/institution categorisation.
4.5 Systemic valuation is obviously inherent to the
quantifiable nature of sport. However, when it takes precedence over other
types of valuation, its effects become distorting. We need to at least
acknowledge this as a development in modern sport. In this respect, the media,
as Lasch (1979) recognised, has had a large part to play. The media encourages
systemic valuation since it is essentially a systemic value-system based on
figures. World Cup matches, like the Olympics, can reach more than a billion
viewers around the world. Commercial networks sign contracts for billions of
dollars for upcoming sports events. These billions of dollars go directly into
sports franchises and bring large profits to team owners, million dollar
salaries to professional players and commercial incentives to amateur
athletes. Player endorsement contracts with sporting goods manufacturers and
other companies bring six to seven figure payments to professional athletes
and Olympic athletes. This means that a massive amount of power is accorded to
the sport and media gatekeepers.
4.6 In terms of the analysis given, it could be argued that if
commercialism is to develop all three kinds of values, including the value of
individual entity, then this latter value would have to be afforded more
status than analytic or systematic value. In terms of human beings, it would
have to examine values in relation to the fulfilment of the person as a unique
entity and not just as a player that has a price on his/her head.
5. Conclusion
5.1 A tripartite formal axiology, first introduced by Hartman
(1967), is advanced in preference to rigid dualisms such as
practice/institution and internal/external in understanding the future
implications for sport’s continuing commercial development. Division of
sport into practice and institution is too simplistic. By definition, the
practice of sport cannot survive in its present form without its corresponding
institution, however, it is a separate question as to whether it is corrupting
the practice. This kind of analysis may enable us to make those kinds of moral
judgements. The virtue of this kind of axiology is that value is not
identified with particular entities (such as an internal good) but is as a
result of analysis of the entity itself. No entity, whether it be a
sportsperson or a sports event is accorded an automatic value. It is dependent
on the value given as a result of the analysis. It is perhaps what MacNamee
(1995) might have envisaged when he recommended "we should perhaps focus
more on the kinds of hierarchically organised moral perspectives in order to
sustain the practices in the best kinds of ways we can" (p70).
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