Critically examining the commercialisation of English football: A case for government intervention?

Dr John Hudson,
Dept of Social Policy and Social Work,
University of York, UK

Abstract:

    There is a growing concern that the increasing commercialisation of English football is having harmful effects on both the game itself and its followers. Here, a brief historical case study of the commercial forces underpinning the development of a current Premiership football club suggests many of the current trends in fact build on long running activities and practices rather than challenging the 'traditions' of football. In light of this, current proposals for state regulation of commercial activity are re-examined. While the paper concludes that there is merit in some of these proposals, it suggests that the way forward involves more than merely 'taming' the commercial activities of football clubs. Instead, it highlights the social benefits of partnerships between civic institutions and commercially successful football clubs.

Introduction:

The increasing commercialisation of English football

    There is little doubt that the increasing 'commercialisation' of English football is one of the key concerns of those associated with the national game. It is difficult to find a football magazine that does not regularly raise the issue, the broadsheet newspapers frequently carry extended analyses of the increasing importance of clubs' commercial activity and the BBC has even devoted an episode of its flagship documentary Panorama to the subject (BBC, 2000a). In addition to these sources, academic writers have also shown a strong interest in the topic. Significantly - and despite Slack's (1998) suggestion that the critique of commercialisation is underdeveloped - the general view here differs little from that found in the press. Lee (1997, p.48), for example, claims that "the commercialisation of English football... has both sanitised and anaesthetised the experience of being a football supporter", while Hamil (1999, p.31) argues that "the fundamental danger of the current commercialisation is that the fan will no longer feel any 'equity' [have a stake] in the game". Mainstream writers have also made similar significant contributions to the debate, with, for example, Conn (1997, p. 176) arguing there is now "profit and commercialism where the heart and soul of football used to be."

    Such concerns can be traced back to a series of events that began with the formation of the Football Association (FA) Premier League at the beginning of the 1992-93 football season (Conn, 1997). English football has a long tradition, the Football Association, founded in 1863, was the world's first such association and amongst its earliest tasks were drawing up the rules of the game and the establishment and management of the world's oldest football competition, the FA Cup (Butler, 1991). This knockout cup competition - which began in 1871 - was followed in 1888 by a twelve-team league competition: the Football League. However, in contrast to the FA Cup, all of the teams participating in the competition were professional and the contest itself was not owned or managed by the FA. Initially a contest for the twelve top teams in England, the competition was soon expanded, firstly with the extension of the League to fourteen teams in 1891 and then through the addition of a 'second division' of fourteen further teams in 1892. Over time, the competition continued to grow, and by 1958 it consisted of four divisions and ninety-two professional clubs (Russell, 1997).

    While for many, the size of this league was an indicator of the strength and depth of English football (Goldstein, 1999), in the late 1980s and early 1990s there was an increasing clamour for change to be instigated. The increasing commercial power of major clubs in Italy and Spain - whose financial muscle was boosted both by television revenues and strong links with regional businesses - began to raise questions about the organisation of English football. The Football League ran the game in a collectivist fashion, selling - for example - television rights on behalf of the whole League and distributing revenue fairly equally amongst its members. But, with the growth in commercial television increasing the competition for live broadcasting rights for top football matches, the big clubs became increasingly aware that a severing of this arrangement would allow them to rake in a much bigger proportion of this revenue for themselves. From 1985 onwards, these clubs began to press for a change, and on a number of occasions their threats to form a break-away league were only halted by increases in the share of TV revenue going to the top teams (Russell, 1997; Conn, 1997).

    With the Football League and the FA in no doubt about the seriousness of the agitation, both put together discussion documents examining possible ways forward for the game. But, while the Football League suggested a merger between themselves and the FA in order to allow football to stand firm and united against the threat of a break-away league (Football League, 1990), the FA took a rather different line, lending their weight to the idea of a breakaway super-league (FA, 1991). In doing so, according to Conn (1997, p.17) the FA was "betraying its historic role as regulator, controller of commercialism for the wider good of football". Within two years - at the start of the 1992-93 football season - the independent FA Premier League was created. The change was a watershed moment in English football and, crucially, it coincided with a similarly significant change in the British broadcasting industry. 1989 had seen the launch of the country's first satellite television companies: British Satellite Broadcasting (BSB) and Sky Broadcasting. Both companies were making big losses and, despite a merger of the two (to form BSkyB Broadcasting), it was clear that they needed a 'killer' product to persuade consumers to invest in both satellite equipment and the monthly subscription charges the service commanded. The company soon found its product: Premier League football. Purchasing exclusive rights for the live broadcast of Premier League matches gave BSkyB the lever it needed in the marketplace, and the number of BSkyB subscriptions increased from under 2 million in 1993 to over 6 million in 1998. While this growth was not entirely due to football, the overwhelming majority of BSkyB subscribers take the company's sports channels (Murroni & Irvine, 1998). But, the rights to broadcast football came at a huge price for the broadcaster; a bidding war with ITV meant they had to pay £305 million to secure rights for the first five years of the Premier League, a huge increase on the £52 million over four years that ITV had previously paid for exclusive rights to the whole of the old Football League (Russell, 1997; Conn, 1997). In 1996, BSkyB extended this deal for a further four years, this time paying an even bigger £670 million fee (Lee, 1997) and in 2000 they signed a staggering £1.1 billion agreement for just three years of live rights (BBC, 2000b).

    The Premier League began, therefore, with a huge influx of new money from satellite television. But, the increased revenue was not used to subsidise ticket prices for those attending matches. Instead, it produced - as predictably as a huge injection of cash into any economic subsystem - rapid wage inflation. With all of the top clubs seeing their revenue increase, the competition for the top players also hotted up, with both transfer fees and players' salaries rising as clubs raised their bidding in the transfer war. Indeed, the new cash set in chain a spiral of inflation, as each increase in the standard transfer fee or salary level sparked further increases from clubs seeking to gain competitive advantage over their rivals. This situation was exacerbated by moves at a higher level to create some form of European 'super league'. With threats of a TV financed breakaway surfacing here too, the game's governing body at the European level - the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) - reformed its cup competitions to create the lucrative 'European Champions' League' for the top teams in its member countries. This in turn meant that for leading English clubs such as Manchester United, Arsenal and Chelsea, the need to have an expensively assembled and well paid squad of international players was further heightened, as they began to compete for a place at the top of the European, as well as domestic, 'league' (Hoehn & Szymanski, 1999).

    Inevitably, this chain of events resulted in a search for additional sources of finance - despite the massive increase in TV revenues - and, essentially, four key routes were identified. Firstly, clubs introduced huge increases in ticket prices. At Chelsea, for example, the average ticket price has risen from £7.50 in 1990 to over £30 today (see Conn, 1997, for further examples). Such increases were largely justified on the grounds of improved product - including the appearance of many top foreign players and the radically improved facilities at stadia that had been significantly upgraded following the 1990 Taylor Report (Taylor, 1990). Secondly, clubs became much more 'professional' in exploiting their fan base, with merchandising - particularly the sale of replica team kits - being given an increased prominence and many clubs opening up expanded club stores (FTF, 1999b). Thirdly, sponsorship opportunities were pursued more vigorously, particularly kit sponsorship deals and pitchside advertising, leading to a substantial increase in both the proportion and totals of income deriving from such sources (see Deloitte & Touche, 2000). Finally, a number of clubs - such as Leicester, Southampton, Newcastle and Sunderland - were subject to stock market flotations designed to raise capital for investment in future building plans (Lee, 1997; Hoehn & Szymanski, 1999).

The implications of commercialisation: Policy shapers begin to take note

    In many ways, this influx of additional money into the game has improved football considerably. After a long period of decline, attendances at professional football matches have risen year-on-year and many of the Premier League games are regularly sold out. In addition, the revamped stadia that house clubs provide a much safer and more comfortable environment for spectators. On the pitch, the Premier League teams have proved successful in attracting big name overseas players, a stark contrast to the late 1980s when few wanted to be involved in English football. What's more, football's new image appears to have been successful in attracting families back to football matches, with the hooliganism that dogged English football in the 1970s and 1980s seemingly on the decline.

    Against this, however, many have also expressed concern that the increasing commercialisation of football threatens to lock out the 'traditional' working class fan who once formed the bedrock of the game and, crucially, for whom football formed their staple leisure activity. It has also been suggested that clubs' aggressive marketing strategies have taken advantage of the captive market provided by their fans - whose loyalties are deeply embedded - often stretching the household budgets of families on small incomes. In short, there is a fear that the commercialisation of what is often viewed merely as game, does, in fact, carry serious negative social consequences.

    Indeed, as Leader of the Opposition in 1995, Tony Blair expressed such anxieties:

I worry that a game in which one individual is deemed to be worth £7 million and whose club must raise the money with ever more lucrative and exclusive television deals, merchandising and expensive seats is a game which may lose touch with its roots. I worry too that fans are taken for granted.... that the dividing line between marketing and exploitation may have been crossed amid the plethora of ever changing strips (quoted in Hamil, Michie & Oughton, 1999, p.22).

    Significantly, his statement was not a one-off comment designed to catch the headlines. Instead, it marked the beginning of a new approach to football related policy. A discourse that had previously been dominated by the need for the state to control the hooliganism perceived to be attached to football fandom (Hamil, 1999; see Home Office, 1998), was replaced with a discourse centred around traditional social policy concerns such as the need to ensure access, equity and fairness.

    Blair's comments were soon followed by the Labour Party's 'Charter for Football' (1995). One of the key promises contained in the document was that Labour would form a football task force to examine social issues connected with football and, following Labour's election victory in 1997, this task force was established - with former Conservative minister David Mellor as its head - in July 1997. Its brief was to "investigate and recommend new measures to deal with the public's concerns on issues such as racism, ticket prices, access for the disabled and the increasing commercialism in the game" (DCMS, 1997). Its establishment signalled a belief, on the government's part, that the dramatic changes in football since the late 1980s were of genuine social significance and, in addition, that the social impacts of these changes - and of the game in general - warranted closer attention from the government and, perhaps, state intervention to ameliorate some of the socially damaging aspects of the modern game.

    While the Football Task Force (FTF) was somewhat slow in tackling the big issues of commercialisation - not least because of its desire to consult widely and produce consensual policy recommendations (Brown, 1999) - from the start it was clear that huge question marks were being placed over the new direction football was perceived to be taking. In December 1998, the FTF released the results of a survey that indicated some two-thirds of football fans with children were now deterred from attending games due to ticket prices. The report was trailed in the media with the by-line that 'many children will be denied a Christmas trip to see their favourite football team over the next few days because of the high price of tickets'. This was sensational enough, but a Task Force spokesperson herself proclaimed "This Boxing Day, there will be many families across the country who would like to be taking their children to the match but can no longer afford to do so... children are being shut out of our football grounds" (BBC, 1998). Significantly, these comments were based on more than just hearsay; some 2,000 fans had been interviewed by FTF for its survey (Williams, 1998), and the findings raised an obvious question: should the government intervene to place caps on ticket prices?

    Similar concerns were raised by the Office of Fair Trading's (OFT) two-year investigation into the pricing of replica kits. In a hard hitting report it concluded that clubs' marketing practices in this area routinely breached the Resale Prices Act 1976 in order to maintain artificially high retail prices. Most notably, the report found that many clubs actively encouraged manufacturers to withhold supplies from retailers who sold merchandise below recommended retail prices, an act which the OFT regarded as nothing less than price fixing (OFT, 1999a). In response to this, the OFT's powers have been strengthened - it is now able to impose penalties of up to 10% of UK turnover on parties involved in price fixing - and Premier League clubs, the FA and a number of kit manufacturers have given assurances that price fixing will no longer take place (OFT, 1999b). Significantly, the OFT placed a particular emphasis on the importance of this move for 'parents of young fans' (ibid.), for much of the popular consensus is that kits are aggressively targeted at this market (Smith, 1998).

    It has also been suggested that changing patterns of club ownership are a matter for concern - with some 21 clubs now being listed on the stock exchange or alternative investment market - and that current marketing practices are driven by such changes. As Godfrey and Holtham (1999) point out, once clubs become public limited companies (plc's) the interests of the new shareholders begin to compete with, and perhaps take precedence over, those of the club's fans or the community the club resides in. Indeed, Hamil argues that the very notion of football clubs acting like commercial companies is somewhat perverse for "football clubs were never intended to be profit-maximising firms. They were intended to act as sporting clubs" (Hamil, 1999, p.25). In fact, the FA's rules "specifically restricted the size of dividend payments... making clubs of little value to institutional investors, as was the intention" (ibid.). However, such rules have been subverted in recent years and, with the FA being noticeably weak in enforcing its own laws (Conn, 1997), there have been calls for alternative regulatory structures to be established in order to allow fans to make their interests heard (Hamil et al, 1999). Certainly the government are taking such calls seriously, for Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, Chris Smith, recently followed up promises made at the 1999 Labour Party Conference by establishing 'Supporters Direct', a scheme designed to make clubs more accountable to fans through the development of share owning supporters' trusts (DCMS, 2000a; Supporters Direct, 2000; Hamil, Michie, Oughton & Warby, 2000).

    The FTF, however, have suggested that more stringent actions are needed in order to prevent the leading clubs from becoming detached from their communities and from the grass roots level. Most notably, their third report - Investing in the Community (FTF, 1999a) - outlined plans for a 5% 'grassroots' levy on the Premier League's next television rights package, a move which could generate around £10 million for investment in community programmes and amateur football. While the government gave tacit approval to this recommendation - with the then Sports Minister Tony Banks suggesting "the government will offer whatever help it can to football in the community and the development of the game at grass roots level" (DCMS, 1999a) - others suggested more radical action was needed. The Institute for Public Policy Research, for example, argued that "if future television deals continue to escalate in value (particularly under pay-per-view) this principle could be extended into a larger 'windfall' levy on the most profitable Premier League clubs (perhaps of around ten per cent) to re-invest in other areas of football" (Godfrey & Holtham, 1999, p.28).

    The frequently levied charge then, is that over the last decade football has been ravaged and ruined by commercialism. Corry and Williamson (1993, p.3) swiftly put their finger on the pulse of opinion when they suggested that "contrary to those who believe in the beneficial effects of the free market, this has lead to, and will increasingly lead to, lack of stability, to a concentration of power among a few firms (clubs), to exploitation of the consumer (fan), to an over-emphasis on advertising, to increased homogeneity of product, and to neglect of the 'collective good'… all the signs of being a great market failure". The situation, it is suggested, has been allowed to get out of control because the FA has now abandoned its historical role as the game's regulator and, instead, thrown its lot in with the money men (Lee, 1997; Conn, 1997).

    The growing consensus is that the only solution to this problem is to by-pass the FA with a modern day regulator. Conn (1999, p.55), for example, believes that "for the moment, at the very least, some regulation needs to be built in to keep prices affordable to people for whom football is an important part of their lives and part of social inclusion. There also needs to be regulation of merchandising, of television coverage, and further work done to make football clubs responsive to their public responsibilities". Similarly, Taylor (2000, p.61) suggests that "if we want a game that remains in touch with a broad swathe of the British public, it seems like some form of independent regulation may be the only way to persuade football to do itself a favour", while Lomax (2000, p.274) feels "regulation of some sort is required... if the game is not to be strangled by the wages spiral on one hand and a plethora of club bankruptcies on the other".

    Significantly, political support for such a body is mounting. The FTF's final report (FTF, 1999b) - Football: Commercial Issues - outlined plans for the establishment of a permanent and independent Football Audit Commission - equipped with real powers to investigate and sanction clubs - a Football 'Ombudsfan' and a new "constitutionally entrenched and detailed Code of Practice". The Coalition of Football Supporters lobbied the FTF heavily for such recommendations and is continuing to press for their implementation (CoFS, 1999). May 1999 saw Bradford South MP, Gerry Sutcliffe, present a ten minute rule bill to the House of Commons calling for an independent football regulator to be established in order to deal with the "huge concerns about the governance of football." (Hansard, 1999; col. 954). Moreover, in July 1999, Kate Hoey was appointed as Minister for Sport; a well known football fan, she had presented a similar Private Member's Bill to Parliament in 1995 (Brown, 2000). 

    Against all this, however, the footballing authorities have sternly opposed suggestions that the game needs an independent regulator. Crucially, members of the FTF connected with the footballing establishment disagreed with the recommendations and much of the tone and content of the final report, and produced a dissenting minority report that denied the existence of serious problems surrounding ticket pricing, merchandising, club ownership or community relations (FTF, 1999b). Significantly, the need for an independent regulator was, therefore, being overplayed in their eyes:

We recognise that football is an essential part of our society's culture and those who govern the game have a duty and responsibility to help develop the game for future generations. Much has been said about a football "regulator". The football authorities do not believe that the overall well-being of the game will be helped by new layers of regulation or bureaucracy (FTF, 1999b, p.71).

    Instead, they suggested an increase in self-regulation and public accountability, primarily through an Independent Scrutiny Panel (ibid.) and the development of Fans' Charters at each football club (FTF, 1999). In contrast to proposals for a Football Audit Commission, this group would not sit permanently, would only report bi-annually, and its aim would be to identify, promote and monitor plans for the implementation of best practice. In short, the game's authorities have proposed a friendly watchdog to stave off the threat of an independent overlord.

    While promising to respond quickly to the issues raised in the FTF's final report, the government took some ten months to formally respond; moreover, rather than taking up the suggestions of either side, it attempted to forge a compromise position and, in doing so, has offered something of a policy fudge. Firstly, this has involved pressing the football authorities into action, giving them the opportunity to put their own house in order. Most notably, perhaps, this has lead to the production of the aforementioned 'Fans' Charters' that outline the 'rights' and 'service levels' fans can expect from their particular club. Secondly, they have decided to establish the Independent Football Commission (IFC), who will 'oversee the regulatory activities' of the footballing authorities; it will do this by means of a 'public annual report' examining the commercial and financial aspects of the game - with particular reference to customer service - and by promoting models of best practice (see DCMS, 2000b). Though carrying 'Independent' in its name, the IFC is described by the government as an attempt to improve 'self-regulation' of the industry, and the role of the footballing authorities in running the IFC is unclear; much, it appears, will depend on the identity of the first Chairman, who - at the industry's request - is to be appointed by the government (ibid.). In many respects the IFC mirrors the 'Independent Scrutiny Panel' outlined in the FTF's minority report, being an advisory board with no formal powers of sanction. However, in establishing the IFC, the government have made it clear they feel important areas of concern need addressing - particularly those surrounding the exclusion of fans from lower income groups - and, significantly, have accepted the argument that there is the need for a permanent committee to examine such issues, rather than the ad hoc arrangement suggested by the industry. In making this decision, the government have guaranteed issues of inclusion and commercialism stay permanently on the agenda and created a body that has the potential to grow into an altogether different 'beast' should self-regulation prove inadequate.

    For the moment, this delicate comprise seems to have appeased both sides. However, the fact that the task force split so openly on the key issue of commercialisation - or that the government have avoided taking sides on the debate - is, in truth, unsurprising. Two different discourses concerning the current health of the game have been evident for some time, and reconciling the two is a difficult task. However, as the policy spotlight increasingly focuses on the twin issues of commercialisation and regulation, the desirability of state regulation in the footballing industry - for social rather than sporting reasons - is becoming a key debate. Much of the validity of the regulationists' claim lies in the argument that English football is undergoing a transformation in character that undermines its historical roots. There is an almost widespread mourning of the passing of the peoples' game and its replacement with what Lee (1997, p.32) feels is the emergence of "grey suits". However, those opposed to the introduction of a regulator might fairly ask just exactly what it is we are mourning the passing of; the discourse of decline often skirts over historical detail and assumes that all that is perceived to be wrong with the game is modern and new and all that is right is old and well established (Williams, 2000). But, the nature of change is open to interpretation; indeed, it might well be argued that commercialisation has far deeper roots in football than is often imagined.

Is commercialisation a new cause for concern?

    As Slack (1998, para. 1) argues, "Since its formative years sport has had a commercial component to its operation". What is under question, however, is the magnitude of commercial activity; when does it cease to be a part of sport and instead become an almost dominant factor? Slack suggests that while "as early as 590 BC Greek athletes were financially rewarded for an Olympic victory... in no previous time period have we seen the type of growth in the commercialisation of sport, that we have seen in the last two decades" (ibid.), a view that chimes with the beliefs of many of those who feel football now needs an independent regulator. Rogan Taylor, for example, argues that "the problem for us in 2000 lies in the fact that [football] is changing so fast. It is not what it once was" (Taylor, 2000; p.55).

    Given that much of the validity of the regulationists' claims lies in a belief that the game has changed radically over the past ten years or so, there is a need for a proper historical examination of the links between commercial activity and professional football. While there is insufficient space to undertake such a task in this paper, it is possible to provide some brief evidence of longstanding links between commercialism and English football and to highlight the longstanding nature of some of the issues that are currently on the policy agenda. In order to do this, key events in the early history of one particular English club's activity - Sunderland Association Football Club (AFC) - are explored below. The evidence is in many senses anecdotal, being offered not because it necessarily reflects a generalisable picture of the nature of the game, but in part for analytic reasons - because the club's past neatly illustrates important links with the present - and in part for pragmatic reasons, drawing on a wider body of research about the club conducted elsewhere by the author (Hudson & Callaghan, 1999).

    At the present moment, Sunderland AFC is one of the largest professional football clubs in England. Currently a member of the Premier League, at the end of the last season (1999-2000) it boasted the third highest average attendance in the country (after Manchester United and Liverpool) - and its annual turnover was in the country's top ten. Like many of the leading English clubs, it has undergone something of a transformation off-the-pitch during the 1990s. After 99 years at its famous Roker Park ground, the club moved to a purpose built all-seater stadium - the Sunderland Stadium of Light - in 1997, a change that was tied to a stock market flotation in December 1996. In December 1999, the club signed a strategic deal with the BSkyB, the broadcaster buying a 9.9% stake in a £13 million package. Commercial activity has been increased and professionalised too, with - most notably - the sale of replica kits being targeted. In February 2000, a deal was struck with the leading multi-national sportswear firm Nike, both parties being keen to maximise the returns from a large and loyal fan base (Sunderland plc, 2000).

    Undoubtedly, these recent changes in commercial practice and organisational structure are important and are indicative of the changes pointed to by those seeking to put the brakes on commercialism with the game. The club is now a multi-million pound plc with multi-national partnerships and has grown from humble origins. Formed in 1879, the club was initially an amateur - and purely sporting - one, with its playing staff composed entirely of local school teachers (Hudson & Callaghan, 1999). Yet, even in the Victorian era the pace of change in football could be fast. The club did not remain an amateur teacher's side for long; within two years of its formation the financial burden of running a competitive club meant membership was opened up to all in the community, and by the mid-1880s Sunderland had established themselves as North-East England's leading side.

    However, the rapid rise in the club's fortunes owed little to the Corinthian spirit that is often assumed to have been an integral part of the game in the Victorian era. Quick to see the potential of the game for promoting the image of Sunderland around the region and beyond, local industrialists from the town's key industries - shipbuilding and coal mining - soon began to exert an influence over the club's affairs. By 1888, the club's three key administrative positions - Chairman, President and Secretary - were all occupied by wealthy industrialists, and their involvement - and their money - triggered a considerable change in the club's outlook (Anderson, 1924). Increasingly, the important fixtures were not those against local opposition but against the big established Scottish clubs - who were often paid big sums to play at Sunderland. Similarly, the players turning out for Sunderland were increasingly brought in from far afield and paid for their services - again with Scots being of great importance. Local businesses often sponsored aspects of the club's work and the location at which games were played changed regularly too as the club's owners strove to find a venue that could both host matches and exclude those fans who had not paid an admission fee. Inside less than a decade of its existence, the club had become a professional and commercial concern, and the teachers who had formed it were increasingly marginalised. Then, as now, the growing influence of money and 'foreign' players was a source of controversy; indeed, so disgusted were some of the club's members - including its founder James Allan - that in May 1888, just two days after industrialists took control of the board, they quit to form a rival team, Sunderland Albion.

    The formation of Albion - and the instant rivalry it created with Sunderland - clearly illustrates the centrality of finance to football, even in those early days. At the time, football was rapidly becoming the key leisure activity for working class men, the game's rise neatly dovetailing with an increase in the amount of leisure time available to workers (Cahill, 1994). When the Football League kicked-off in 1888, for Sunderland and Sunderland Albion, the goal was clear: to build a strong, professional club capable of breaking into the guaranteed high crowds - and high income - of the new competition.

    The rivalry between the two was fierce, but the key battles took place off the pitch. In Albion's first season the two clubs were drawn together in both the county and the FA Cup. However, Sunderland withdrew from both competitions when this happened; as far as the Sunderland board were concerned, they would rather lose out themselves than help swell the coffers of their rival upstarts with two bumper gates (Hudson & Callaghan, 1999). The decision was hardly made in a spirit of good will; indeed, it was entirely motivated by commercial concerns and a desire to maintain market position. When pressure from Albion forced the two teams to meet later in a friendly game, Albion were again outflanked politically: Sunderland agreed to the game, but suggested the gate money be donated to a local hospital. Albion had no choice but to agree, and lost out on the proceeds of a huge 18,000 gate.

    It was money Albion dearly needed to challenge Sunderland on the field. While they achieved success on the pitch - lifting the County Cup in their first season - Sunderland continued to grab the headlines, their extra financial muscle allowing them to stage exhibition games against top class opposition (Anderson, 1948) - including a showpiece victory against Football League and FA Cup double winners Preston North End. Consequently, when - in May 1890 - the Football League's AGM considered applications to what The Sunderland Echo described as "the charmed circle" (Sunderland Echo, 2.5.1890, p.1), Sunderland won the race to become the first team to be admitted to the competition since its creation, despite strong applications from Albion and a number of teams from elsewhere in England. Crucially, finance again played a key role - Sunderland's offer to pay the travelling expenses of visiting teams appears to have swayed the committee - but there had been a long run-in to the 'election'. The fact that Sunderland's team contained top quality professional players from around Britain, the large and well built ground - with media facilities - that housed the club, the successful staging of, and strong team performances in, exhibition matches against existing Football League sides and a well connected board made up of rich local industrialists, all helped to secure a valuable league place for Sunderland. In short, it was a story of success built on the firm foundations of finance.

    Commenting on the decision, the Sunderland Echo argued that while Albion may have done enough to warrant admission too, "as the younger club it can well afford to wait its turn" (Sunderland Echo, 3.5.1890). Hindsight, however, tells us they were sadly mistaken. With Sunderland guaranteed weekly competitive fixtures against the country's top teams, interest in Albion began to fade. While they managed to retain some momentum by competing in what was in effect the unofficial second division of the league - the Football Alliance (Mason, 2000c) - Sunderland's strong performance in the real event soon threatened Albion's very existence. Indeed, in just their second season in the competition, Sunderland were crowned League Champions, and the effect on Albion was predictable. On the night Sunderland received the Championship trophy - presented at the Queen's Hotel in Sunderland - Albion's board met in the Empress Hotel. There, they were faced with the gloomy reality of a huge financial deficit resulting from their failure to keep pace with the Champions; a massive £500 was needed to keep the club on professional terms - far more than they could afford to meet. While Sunderland accepted the plaudits lavished on Champions, Albion's board poignantly decided to wind their club up.

    When Albion admitted defeat, it was because the battle had been lost as much on the commercial as on the footballing field (Hudson & Callaghan, 1999). Crucially for the claims being made here, Sunderland themselves were well aware of this fact. As Hutchinson (1999; p.28) argues, "Sunderland AFC's board realised that money was the root of success. If Albion were allowed to overtake them in attracting paying customers, then Albion would inherit Sunderland's footballing world. That was the reason for Sunderland's extraordinary [expenditure] at the start of the 1888-89 season". Significantly, shortly after entry to the league - and after securing two further Championships in three years - the club confirmed its status as a commercial entity by converting itself into a limited company. What's more, the short prospectus for the share issue trumpeted the economic side of the club's activity, arguing that:

games played by the Sunderland team away and at home have been the means of bringing the town and its locale to great prominence, previously to which, in many parts of the Kingdom, it was comparatively unknown. Moreover, the tradesmen of the town have benefited by the many thousands of visitors from all parts which its fame has attracted (SAFC, 1896, p.1).

    The primary purpose of the share issue - which took place in the summer of 1896 - was to raise more money for investment in the team and the club's infrastructure, particularly the stadium; as such, its motives were not dissimilar to those of the 1996 stock market flotation. Indeed, both share issues were followed by a move to a bigger stadium, to Roker Park in 1899 and to the Stadium of Light in 1996. Though a century apart, both issues took place in a time of rapid change and increasing commercialism within the game. A case, perhaps, of plus ça change? As Williams points out, it is too easy to look back romantically at the past and suggest that action is needed to restore the game to its former self. Not only do such rose tinted views often skim over the less appealing aspects of football's past, but "little of this kind of thinking has any useful purchase... on producing realistic policies for football" (Williams, 2000, p. 97). Indeed, examples of cynical commercialism are easy to find even in the so-called age of 'gentlemanly capitalism'; for example, when Sunderland met their local rivals Newcastle on Christmas Eve 1898, admission prices were raised to cash in on a guaranteed bumper gate (Mason, 1999). Similarly, when the two sides met in the FA Cup quarter-final in 1909, prices were doubled (Brett & Clark, 1995). On a slightly different note, the concern over spiralling transfer fees is nothing new either; when Sunderland sold Alf Common to Middlesbrough for £1,000 in 1905 - the first ever four figure transfer fee - The Athletic News expressed their disgust, arguing "as a matter of sport the Second Division would be more honourable than retention of [a First Division] place by purchase" (in Mason, 2000b, p.30). Nor are substantial remuneration packages for top players a new phenomenon; in luring a Scottish international centre-back to the club in 1889, Sunderland offered him a signing on fee of £150, a further £20 for signing professional forms, £50 towards the rental of a boot and shoe shop in the town centre - which the club also fitted out for him - and paid two years' wages - a total of £300 - up front (Hutchinson, 1999). In total, it was a deal worth well in excess of £500 for a couple of years' work, a sum that was big enough to cause rivals Sunderland Albion to go bust some three years later.

    If the regulationists' claims that state intervention is now needed are to have any moral force, then they need to be based on much more than the belief that commercialism has appeared out of nowhere and destroyed a once noble and decent game. Rather than demonstrating that commercialism is at the core of football - for really it always has been - they need to show that its effects have now started to become somewhat more pernicious than in the past. Significantly, they have tried to do this by pointing to the exclusion of less well off fans. Indeed, a survey undertaken on behalf of the TFT not only showed that ticket prices in the top division had risen dramatically over recent years - by 312% between 1989 and 1999 compared to an increase in general prices of just 54.8% - but, more significantly, of those who used to go to matches but no longer do, some 70% cited ticket prices as the main reason (see Williams, 1998). Indeed, in Brown's view (2000, p.252) "the ticket price spiral has been nothing short of a form of social exclusion for the low-paid and unwaged, young and old."

    However, while there is little doubting that such figures are true - certainly the cost of being a fan has escalated in recent years - again it would be too simple to assume that exclusion didn't occur in the past. As Williams (2000) points out, football interacts with other important trends in society, one of which over the past twenty years has been a sharp rise in income inequality (Commission on Social Justice, 1994). On top of this, changes in the structure of the economy have brought changes in the structure of the class system too; most notably the middle classes have increased in size, while the working classes have diminished. In short, life is not what it was in the 1950s, when a fully-employed economy, in a society dominated by working class jobs and lifestyles, saw football grounds throughout England regularly packed with fans (Russell, 1997). With society having changed so radically in recent decades, it would be unrealistic to expect football grounds to have by-passed such changes. It is not, as Lee (1997) implies, that unappreciative new middle class fans have replaced the old working class ones at football matches; it is more that the middle class has begun to replace parts of the working class in our society. Moreover, to assume these fans are 'new' - as so much of the rhetoric does - is somewhat short-sighted; as the Norman Chester Football Research Unit Fans' Surveys show, the overwhelming majority of football fans were introduced to football - and more importantly to their particular football team - by someone in their family, and usually their father; when a child of working class parents follows dominant social trends of the time and takes employment in a middle class occupation, their family ties and local community bonds are not automatically diminished as a consequence. In short, it is wrong to assume that middle class fans are 'new' or that people lose interest in the game when increasing social mobility enables them to move between social classes.

    Yet, this does not directly address the issue of access to games. Irrespective of their status as 'new' or 'old' fans, it would appear that the average football fan is increasingly affluent and many of those on low incomes are being excluded (FTF, 1999b; Williams, 1998). Again, however, it would be wrong to assume that large groups of people were not excluded in the past. If one looks beyond the golden age of the 1950s, then the picture is one of wildly fluctuating attendances. While glancing at record books (see Rollin & Rollin, 1999) gives the impression that the 1930s were a time of blockbuster gates - Sunderland's record crowd of 75,118 was set then and the same applies to Arsenal (73,295 in 1935), Newcastle (68,386 in 1930), Spurs (75,038 in 1938) and Sheffield Wednesday (72,841 in 1934) for example - closer examination of the figures paints a different picture. What is noticeable in the case of Sunderland is a huge standard deviation in the figures for each season; while the FA Cup matches and local derby games regularly drew big gates, run of the mill League games drew substantially smaller crowds (see Graham, 1995; Hutchinson, 1999; Hudson, 1999).

    In other words, the attendance figures show that football was not as widely accessible in earlier generations as many presume. Even for the big cup or derby matches, many faced problems finding the admission price. When Sunderland's record gate of 75,118 flocked to see the team play Derby County in a quarter-final replay of the 1933 FA Cup, local industrialists donated money to the Employment Exchange for the 'deserving unemployed' who wanted to see the game (Mason, 2000a). And, when the Sunderland board doubled prices for the 1909 FA Cup quarter-final replay against Newcastle, the attendance was half that expected, and many fans were outraged; indeed, one wrote to The Sunderland Echo arguing that "The club must remember that their supporters are working men, the majority of whom, owing to the bad state of trade in the town are not able to pay more than the humble 'tanner'" (quoted in Brett & Clark, 1995; p.17). All this suggests that in a previous era of marked income inequality, access to football was a problem then as it is now. In other words, 'social exclusion' is more than a modern day occurrence.

A Third Way for football and social policy?

    It is wrong, therefore, to paint a one-dimensional picture of the present that assumes that money has suddenly transformed football from the people's game into a soulless commercial activity. Even a brief examination of the past shows, as Walvin puts it (2000, p. 66), that "commercial involvement in football is… as old as the game", and that "the degree of modern day involvement ought not to persuade us that it is a new phenomenon". However, in Sunderland's case, while commercial operations and ticketing prices have escalated in recent years, so too have their not-for-profit community activities, and this is another crucial dimension of change that is currently missing from the debate. Numerous analyses of the commercialisation of football point to the flotation of Sunderland (and others) on the stock market as an indication of where football's priorities have been lost (Lee, 1997; Godfrey & Holtham, 1999), but such studies fail to pick up on other, more community oriented changes in the club's structure. Most notably in Sunderland's case, the move towards public limited status has been accompanied by a marked expansion of their long running community programme and the launch of an autonomous, not-for-profit community arm of the club, called SAFCommunity, through which to deliver it (Hudson & Callaghan, 1999). The two moves are not unconnected, for the expansion in the size of the club - particularly the new stadium - has increased revenues and, in turn, opened up new possibilities for investment in not-for-profit community activities (SAFC, 1999).

    Commended by the Football Trust as a model for football clubs' participation in their local communities, SAFCommunity's range of activities is impressive in scope and scale. The club's new stadium holds purpose built educational facilities, with some 10,000 school children a year visiting the club - free of charge - to receive national curriculum based lessons delivered by the club's two full time teachers. The change of setting - and its connection with the world of football - helps to enthuse many children in a way normal classes cannot. Similarly, the club has pioneered an attendance reward scheme to help combat truancy, where free match tickets and stadium tours are given to pupils with excellent attendance records or those whose attendance has dramatically improved. The club also employs 37 community coaches, who make a combined average of 55 school coaching visits per week, often to some of the poorest areas of the North East. A strong emphasis has also been placed on health education. The club - along with local councils and health authorities - recently established the 'Sunderland AFC Health Accord'. Put simply, it uses the power of the club's brand to grab attention and deliver important messages surrounding issues such as smoking and drug abuse. The recent drugs awareness campaign, for example, targeted messages at some 2,000 local schools, with specially written literature featuring players' messages being combined with a poster design competition and school visits from top players such as the club's international strikers Kevin Phillips and Niall Quinn. On top of the work with local school children, the club have also worked hard with other groups in the community. For example, they were involved in supporting the launch of the government's New Deal for the young unemployed, offering free match tickets to people signing up for training programmes. Similarly, the University for Industry - a national programme piloted in Sunderland - was closely linked with the club; IT for All sessions, for example, being offered at the Stadium of Light. In a city with high unemployment, low educational attainment levels and relatively poor levels of health, the importance of such work should not be underestimated (see SAFC, 1999; Hudson & Callaghan, 1999; see SAFC, 2000 for more detail of SAFCommunity).

    On top of all this, the club has also made an overt commitment to 'affordable football' (SAFC, 1999; Hudson & Callaghan, 1999). With the expansion from a vastly diminished 22,000 capacity at the ageing Roker Park to 42,000 at the Stadium of Light, the club have taken the opportunity to develop a much more flexible pricing structure, offering cheap access for the young, unemployed and elderly; indeed, they currently offer some 17,000 concessionary tickets for each game - more than any other club in the country. In short, the club is making a genuine attempt to strike a balance between operating as a successful business and sporting enterprise on the one hand and acting as a responsible civic institution with serious community responsibilities on the other.

    However, while a growing number of clubs are implementing excellent community projects along these lines, the truth is that these are probably the exception rather than the rule. (see Boyle, 2000 for a comparison with their neighbours Newcastle United). Indeed, Brown (2000, p257) suggests that in the course of his work with the FTF it was apparent that "whilst a few demonstrated they had schemes in place to tackle issues of exclusion, by far the majority saw little reason to alter their practices greatly, something particularly prevalent in the Premier League". Unsurprisingly therefore, while the FTF appeared to be united in its belief that the social, sporting and commercial aspects of the game need to be balanced, it was when discussion moved to the methods that ought to be used to ensure that such a balance is being struck - and the measures that might be employed to gauge when commercialism is acting to the detriment of one or the other factors - that clear divisions in policy and sharply differing interpretations of the evidence began to emerge. The difficulty facing the government, therefore, is that of balancing the increasingly vocal desire on many fans' part for some form of regulation to fetter the perceived excesses of commercialism (FTF, 1999b) with the footballing authorities' belief that "overbearing regulation is not the way forward" (op. Cit.; p.64) because "English football is not an under-governed sport, nor by comparison with other sports and business sectors is it badly governed" (op. Cit.; p.70). What is needed, perhaps, is for the government to strike a 'Third Way' (Giddens, 1998) between these two courses; a compromise solution that allows clubs to build on the commercial and sporting successes of the past decade while also addressing the issue of exclusion. Significantly, the current government has shown a strong interest in the issues surrounding the wider problem of social exclusion and has charged all of its departments with the task of thinking creatively in this area (SEU, 1998). In this context, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport have noted that sport can play a big role in improving the health, education and employability of individuals in socially deprived areas, while also increasing feelings of solidarity within communities (DCMS, 1999b). However, the policy attention in this area has focused very much on developing partnerships with voluntary organisations and neighbourhood sports clubs (ibid.; Collins, Henry, Houlihan & Buller, 1998). This, it seems, misses the very significant point that professional football clubs provide a huge common focus for many people in deprived areas and, as such, are ideally placed to make a genuine positive impact on their communities in the kind of ways Sunderland AFC are trying to.

    If the government are serious about using sport to tackle social exclusion, and if those calling for a fettering of commercial activity are genuine in their desire to a find a way to make football a more socially responsible industry, then the development of public-private partnerships to facilitate schemes like the Sunderland AFC Health Accord will do far more for socially excluded communities than upper limits for ticket prices or tough action on the marketing of replica football kits. There are signs that public bodies are beginning to see the benefits of such collaboration; for example, in Wolverhampton the football club play a key role in the local Health Action Zone (Haznet, 2000) and in London, Charlton Athletic (Collins et al, 1998) and West Ham United (DCMS, 1999c) have been working with local authorities in schemes designed to tackle racism. However, despite the success of such partnerships, they continue to be quite rare and ad-hoc; a more systematic approach from government - along with some funds - and a commitment from the footballing authorities to develop and invest in such partnerships on a wider basis would surely bring positive gains for deprived neighbourhoods, help football clubs put something back into their communities and help government meet important social policy goals in innovative, creative and effective ways.

    For many years political commentators have hailed German society for the responsible form of 'social capitalism' its businesses have pioneered (Hutton, 1995). The model - supposedly predicated neither on free market capitalism or state interventionist socialism - was able to exist because of the carefully managed 'corporatist' partnerships between government, business and local communities (Esping-Andersen, 1990). While the need for a commercially successful economy was accepted, so too was the need for industry to consider its wider social responsibilities by participating in important social welfare programmes; a so called 'middle way' was established (Smith, Paterson & Padgett, 1996). The model has important lessons for those currently involved in the debate about English football's future; while the problems brought by increasing commercialisation cannot be swept under the carpet for much longer, simple calls for greater regulation and price capping powers are likely to flounder on legal grounds and increase tension between different sections of the footballing community. What's more, in a time when the sphere of government activity is increasingly being 'hollowed out' and the agenda shaped by the twin developments of globalisation and regionalisation (Rhodes, 1997), the call for a 150 year old industry to be regulated by a new centralised state body seem somewhat anachronistic. It is undoubtedly the case that in the issue of exclusion, football has a problem, but it is neither a new problem nor one that can be easily addressed without wider action to combat the social exclusion that has ravaged an increasing minority of British society. But, by working together in serious and focused partnerships, government and football can move towards helping to tackle the causes of this problem rather than merely addressing its symptoms.

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